Cyprus’ Accession in NATOs Partnership for Peace

Cyprus Accession in NATOs Partnership for calm precisThe present-day(a) semi insurance-making debate which has emerged recently in the polity-making bowlful of Cyprus regarding the offspring of Cyprus access in NATOs programme Partnership for quiet (PfP) aggravated a abounding discussion concerning the historical preference of the boorishs remote constitution. Although Cyprus has been a full fraction of the European nub since the 1st of May 2004, its comprehensive fight to European Security and falsification Policies and structures is questi hotshotd and part limited. This statement is an emanation of the occurrence that Cyprus constitutes the only Member some(prenominal)ize in the EU, which is n all a member of NATO nor of the PfP. Therefore, the sporting lady indirect absence seizure from Hesperian security and defence structures combined with the Turkish intensive participation causes several(prenominal) native and external implications and raise doubts co ncerning, both the exact consumption of Cyprus in the European Security system, as headspring as the prox of the dialogue regarding traffic mingled with NATO and the EU. This topic explores tercet antithetical phases of Cyprus contrasted indemnity and tries to evaluate the reasons which led to the partial adjustment in its directions. In limited, through with(predicate)out the Cold War, Cyprus imposeed a policy of the Non-Aligned Movement. However, in 1990 it utilise for EEC social rank transforming its remote policy and shaping a European orientation. Nevertheless, since February 2008 the new elected President Demetris Christofias a former attraction of the commie caller AKEL- has been categorically rejecting to put Cyprus in the path of gate into the NATOs PfP. As the conclusion states, although Cyprus foreign policy is Europe-oriented, in that location atomic number 18 particular cases which indicate that the soils foreign policy is non elongated and is partially spiel depending on the semi semipolitical sympathiess political and ideological orientation. The closing valuement of whether the foreign policy transformations atomic number 18 rational and upright for Cyprus remains controversial and open to several(predicate) interpretations.IntroductionThe exercise and instruction execution of foreign policy comprise a decisive parameter which mark and defines the states external behaviour, as well as its politico-ideological lieu in the domain(prenominal) system. Undoubtedly, the establishment and cultivation of external relations, as well as the ability to inaugurate diplomatic contacts with other states and international organizations, are all fundamental elements of international relations, which enhance and reinforce the states position in the international scene and improve the climate of cooperation surrounded by states. However, a basal question that conveys to be addressed and evaluated concerning the carrying into action of foreign policy is whether it remains peach and linear, or is organismness modify and adjusted depending on evolving national interests and the rapid changes which are observed in the international environment. If the latter scenario is the case, the question which arises has to do with the variety of different factors which leave and lead to the transformation and the partial redefinition of the national foreign policy direction. disdain the fact that it is a relatively small island, the state of Cyprus has had a rich and diverse history, .This paper give try on the case study of Cyprus foreign policy, analysing and critically attacking its evolutionary ferment throughout the years, trying to append to the discussion concerning the orientations and transformations of the realms foreign policy throughout its existence. As the methodological type of this research is a case study, this paper tries to think on the historical process of Cyprus foreign policy se eking to assess the factors which led to its partial redefinition and rethinking during three crucial stages of its history. It is worthy to clarify that the purpose of this paper is not to amaze and examine the Cyprus Problem per se, just now how Cyprus axiom and still sees its place in Europe through the exercise and execution of its foreign policy. This explanatory case study attempts to evaluate three different stages which reveal the asymmetric nature and non linear orientation of the countrys foreign policy.As the conclusion states, although Cyprus after 1990 has been adjacent a steady European orientation, its foreign policy has not changed, but is partly modulated and adjusted depending on the ideological background of the party in presidential term activity. The spare-time activity depth psychology will prove that despite the fact that Cyprus foreign policy is Europe-oriented, whatsoever of its aspects are now hostage to the governments ideology. What diversifies this paper from the existing literature is the inter symbolise between internal and external dynamics in foreign policy perceptions. The structure of the WorkThis paper is divided into three parts constitute on three different approaches and intents of Cyprus foreign policy. The source chapter examines Cyprus foreign policy in the truly early years of its existence, when it set about the dilemma of either being a satellite state, expressing entertain to either of the devil superpowers, or to remain neutral. Bypassing the intensive disagreement from the Turkish Cyprian Vice President, President Makarios, took the determination to participate in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961 keeping the country a personal manner from the direct epicentre of the Cold War. later on following a non- aline foreign policy during the Cold War and with the Cyprus worry being unresolved, the Cypriot political lead-in unyielding that the country unavoidable to dramatically change the orientation of its foreign policy. Following the design test of Cyprus non-aligned foreign policy during the Cold War, the second chapter deals clearly with the immediate maculation Cold-War era, where one could notice a total coggle and a prodigious alteration of the countrys foreign policy. This chapter argues that the period after 1990 croup be characterized as an effort from the Cyprus government to approach and join the western European structures maintaining at the homogeneous time, friendly relations with the former Soviet Union countries. In 1990, Cyprus applied for membership of the EEC in regulate to achieve a series of national, political, and frugal goals.The third chapter will present and analyze one of the approximately recent and contemporary political debates, concerning the slue of Cyprus comprehensive participation in European Security and Defence structures and policies, with additive emphasis on the produce of Cyprus luck of joining NATOs PfP. l ater the examination and analysis of the above three periods which showed a different motive from Cypriot governments concerning the orientation of foreign policy, this paper concludes with an boilersuit assessment of the same leaves. Although the purpose of this paper is not to make predictions and speculations for the future, it is unavoidable to pose some crucial questions for further research about how Cyprus sees its place in Europe. publications review Methodological approach Conceptual clarificationsIt is astray accepted that the Cyprus business is by its nature a rattling tenebrous, sensitive, ambiguous and controversial political problem which thunder mug be approached from a variety of different political angles depending on the substance one projects the variant balances and realities in Cyprus. When studying cases ilk Cyprus, an objective researcher must take into account a series of different variables concerning the politico-ideological ambiguities in th e context of the Cyprus political arena in send to be objective and formulate realistic arguments. A significant limit which emerges in research methodology, as well as in the process of the examination and evaluation of recourses is the question of military go forthivity and the realistic interpretation either of the first sources or of the historical proceedings. The way the political life in Cyprus is structured, contributes a rich philosophical tradition of debate between the political tendencies, which offers different explanations, different interpretations and point different conclusions. If we apply the theory that a coin has unendingly two sides and an argument has two different explanations, in the case of Cyprus, some(prenominal) coins name too m any sides.The present brief literature review presents the major works published in the side language on the Cyprus issue in general. It is worthy to tick that the great majority of social scientific works on Cyprus a re rivet on Cyprus political problem and the conflict between the two communities and their political and territorial aspirations in the island. The impact of the factors which led to the reformulation of foreign policy place, or indeed the impact of the political debates in Cyprus political arena on foreign policy is comparatively little explored. The works contained herein view as been chosen because of their relevance to one or to a greater extent of the major themes path through the paper. Regarding the three key areas of this research, i.e. Cyprus foreign policy, Cyprus EU memory access process and Cyprus and PfP the majority of the literature on Cyprus is extremely vast and teach on the second, less so on the first, and virtually nonexistent on the last.In particular, one contemporary, objective and realistic account is offered by pack Ker- Lindsay, 2004,2005,2008. Ker-Lindsay and Hubert Faustman 2009 also at a lower placetook a comprehensive research on the politics a nd government of Cyprus, providing us a solid argumentation about the countrys political realities. Other historical backgrounds and analysis are offer by other authors like Markides, 1977 The Rise and fall of the Cyprus Republic Bitsios, 1975, Cyprus the vulnerable Republic, Polyviou, 1975 Cyprus The tragedy and the challenge. Theophylactou Demetrios presented in 1995 his interpretation concerning the security, identity and the nation expression offering a comprehensive work on the Cyprus issue based on a combination of home(prenominal) and external factors. Concerning Cyprus EU doorway process at that place is an extensive literature. Nattalie Tocci 2004 examined the prospect of Cyprus admission charge process as a throttle for calmnessfulness to the political problem and offered an evaluation of the manipulation of the EU to the conflict resolution in Cyprus. Moreover, Theophanous 2005 analysed the type of the EU in the Eastern Mediterranean, and its impact on the Cypru s question. Additionally, Brewin 2000, Christou 2004 and Stephanou 2005, analyzed the period of accessions negotiations and assessed the implications which emerged in the countrys accession process and in the path towards the final membership.Nevertheless, the guidance of the third chapter, concerning the Cyprus lotion for PfP membership constitutes a very contemporary issue and thus almost absent from the current literature. However, this does not mean that it will be consumed in speculation theories, as it is a useful representative which proves that Cyprus foreign policy is not linear and is being adjusted depending on a series of political, national and ideological factors. Therefore, the author has used many comprehensive accounts on Cyprus and the Cyprus problem which also evaluate some of the basic foreign policy aspects that are assessed in this paper. Furthermore the works of Howorth 2007 on European Security and Defence Policy and Kentas 2005 on Cyprus and PfP were very helpful for this particular analysis Moreover, as there is a need to lowstand the position of the political parties, it was move to take interviews from all political parties, as well as from members of the core- executive director. It can be argued that the interviews offered the author the opportunity to get out on a lower floorstand the existing political perceptions especially about the issue of PfP.A diplomatic neutrality Cyprus contrasted policy of the Non-Aligned MovementThe agreements negotiated in Zurich and capital of the United nation in February 1959 between the three warrantor powers Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom led to the declaration of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960 .Apart from the domestic political implications, President Makarios, who was the first President of Cyprus, faced an early challenge and a significant dilemma. The particular proposition dilemma and foreign policy decision has partly marked the countrys path and participation in internat ional politico-economic affairs. In the apex of the Cold War, and with the international balances being sensitive and fragile, Cyprus government had three options regarding its foreign policy position and reaction to the global and political classifications.Firstly, there was a weakened assumption that Cyprus should have joined NATO as it belongs in the sphere of its influence and due to the fact that the three guarantor powers of the Republic are members of NATO. Besides the islands strong indirect bonds with NATO, one could argue that, according to the informal and secret agreement between the classic florescence Minister Constantinos Karamanlis and his Turkish counterpart Mederes, which was signed in Zurich in February 1959, Greece and Turkey, agreed to shop at a future Cyprus accession in NATO. However, the puzzle of this case implies the fact that Makarios was informed and agreed to the specific provision of the agreement. Secondly, there has been a perception that Cyprus wo uld have drifted to the Soviet bloc, due to the impact, the friendly relations and the significant power of the communist party in Cyprus AKEL with the Soviet executive structures. However, those who knew and understood the political philosophy of President Makarios, realized that the most leave foreign policy option for Cyprus was the direction of the Non-Aligned Movement, as an effort to approach the third-world countries and the Arab world.The Non-Aligned Movement constitutes an international brass section of states considering themselves not formally and directly aligned with or against any major power bloc .As mob Ker-Lindsay accurately observes, in 1955 Makarios was one of the many attractors who attended the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung in Indonesia .However, all scenarios that Cyprus would have joined and verbalized support to either of the two superpowers remained only speculation, as Makarios decided that the outflank foreign policy direction for Cyprus was to join the NAM. An observation of the Cypriot routine press of the period shows that the decision generated slight repercussions in some political and social lobbies on both a domestic and international level. In particular, it is worthy to note that the Non-Aligned orientation provoked the intensive disagreement of the Turkish Cypriot vice president Dr. Fazil Kutchuk, despite the fact that he did not exert his veto right to block the decision . It is commonly believed that the Turkish Cypriot vice president was urged by Ankara to accept Makarios decision to make Cyprus a member of the NAM. Turkeys political leadership believed that if Cyprus joined NATO and participated in the political and security structures of the occidental alliance, Turkeys ability to intervene in Cyprus on any occasion under Article 4 of the accordance of Guaranty would be severely curtailed and subject to delays as it would need the essential approval of the other NATO member states.During the procedures of the capital of Serbia and Montenegro Conference in 1961 Cyprus became one of the twenty five founder states of the NAM. A basic explanation of this choice, which does not require any political analysis is that Makarios maintained excellent and friendly relations with a number of leading figures from Bandungs Conference, especially Yugoslavias Josep Broz Tito and Egypts Abdul Gamal Nasser, and he was already forge a reputation as a leader across the Arab world . Moreover, the fact that Makarios first appointed overseas visit was to Egypt to see his very good friend and colleague President Nasser instead of visiting Greece was unexpected. Additionally, the general consensus regarding the choice of NAM is proved by the fact that, even General Georgios Grivas who was the leader of EOKA and then one of the most intensive sources of opposition over Makarios policies, claimed that the drift towards the Arab world was promising and successful, expressing simultaneously his frustration at the way the Western allies treated Cyprus. Furthermore, he did not hesitate to call the classic government to withdraw from NATO .Apart from the above, the general social frustration concerning the way the Western Allies treated Hellenic Cypriots during several times in contemporary Cyprus history, accomplished another(prenominal) reason which demonized NATO in the eyes of the Greek Cypriot people. The initial negative experience the Cypriots obtained from the West has concerned the way the British responded to the demand of self determination and alliance with Greece. Although Cypriots participated and fought for the British in the Second World War, the British governments misplaced Cypriot hopes that Britain would have interpreted a more encouraging and positive position regarding the issue of union with Greece. Moreover, another crucial reason which proves the social disappointment to the British attitude has been the content and provisions of the various partitionist plans for a settlement proposed by several British officials. In particular such plans prepared and submitted by muster Sir John Harding in 1956 in his negotiations with Makarios, the ideas of Lord Radcliffe in December of the same year and the comprehensive proposal prepared by British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in 1958. All these plans were assessed and rejected as unacceptable by the Greek Cypriot leadership and provoked a general qualm against British policy over Cyprus.The issue of the Greek appeal in the UN seems to be very crucial. After the referendum organized by the Orthodox church building calling for unity with Greece .Theophylactou, who offers an interpretation of Makarios position, claims that Makarios, whose political philosophy was steadily lamentable away from Athens national policy vis- a- vis Cyprus, had dismissed enosis and adopted a policy of Non-alignment and independence for Cyprus . Furthermore, it is noticeable that Greece was highly economically dependent on economic and financial support from the West and did not wish to stake the loss of its economic lank. As Makarios committed himself to the NAM he began to pursue his give political initiatives.Evaluating his policies one could argue that the vast majority of his decisions were piecemeally being contradicted with the policies of the National Centre. Makarios was being supported by AKEL and he was trying to implement policies that satisfied the partys electorate as he was heavily dependent on AKELs support. Nevertheless, after the breakdown of peace in Cyprus the US with the active support of Britain tried to propose plans to bring about a settlement. After the rejection of the Acheson plans by Makarios in 1964 and his broader approach to the Soviet Union, the US through their President Johnson had been worried about the possibility of Cyprus eventually becoming the Cuba of Mediterranean and Makarios the Castro of the area .However, assessing the theatrical role of the NAM in the efforts for a settlement in the Cyprus issue, it is questioned whether it has positively and actively contributed or whether its support was limited in rhetoric. It is worthy to note that interviewing the political party officers in the Greek Cypriot side, there is not an intense assumption that the direction of NAM was wrong and no party criticised Makarios for the specific orientation he attributed to the countrys foreign policy.In the following years the political anomaly had dramatically increased. In July 1974, Turkey found the pretext to impose its partitionist plans against Cyprus, following the coup of 15th of July, perpetrated against the elected government of President Makarios by the Athens military junta. On July 20, claiming to act under article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee, the Turkish armed forces staged a full scale invasion against Cyprus. Though the invasion was in ravishment of all rules of international legality, including the UN Charter, Turkey proceeded to occupy the northern part of the island. subsequently on, the basis for a solution of the Cyprus problem was set in two High Level Agreements. Both agreements, (between President Makarios and the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash, in February 1977 and between President Kyprianou and Denktash in May 1979), were concluded under the auspices of the UN deposit General. Apart from the High Level Agreements several initiatives were attempted especially from the Greek-Cypriot side to risk a settlement through UN mediation. In particular until 1990 one could argue that the initiatives of the Secretary Generals of the UN Kurt Waldheim, Javier Prez de Cullar and Boutros Boutros Ghali were the most comprehensive efforts for a settlement. All the above initiatives clashed to the intransigent position of the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash. After the subsequent failures to inaugurate negotiations for the resolution of the Cyprus problem, which was the primary foreign policy objective f or the Cyprus Government, the Cypriot political leadership decided in 1990 to change the orientation of the countrys foreign policy.Westernisation of Foreign Policy Cyprus European orientation as a catalyst for peace or source of further implications?The end of the Cold War, proved that the Western and European structures and values would dominate in the new era which was emerging and uprising. As the most sensitive issue for Cyprus was the necessity to intensify the efforts to find a negotiated settlement to the Cyprus problem, the Cypriot political leadership realised the need to partly transform the countrys foreign policy, implementing a policy aiming at a final accession into the EEC/EU.However, this foreign policy transformation created a strong reaction and opposition from AKEL. The communist party which had positively contributed to the election of President Vasiliou in the Cypriot Presidency in 1988, declared an intensive disagreement concerning Cyprus application for EEC membership. According to the official AKELs position, they considered the EEC as an imperialistic and neoliberal economic organisation which was using its economic power to pursue its political power in the world against the interests of the poor countries .AKEL saw the EEC as just another Western ally of the United States and NATO and strongly believed that Cyprus has no place and nada to be benefited from organizations which organized and advocated to the Turkish invasion and the conspiracy of 1974. On the opposite word all the other political parties including the right wing Democratic beleaguer (DHSY), the centre wing Democratic Party (DHKO) and the Socialist Party (EDEK) were vigorously supporting Cyprus accession and harmonization to the European structures . In the meantime, in 1993 Glafkos Clerides, the leader of the right wing Democratic Rally, a former President of the polarity of Representatives (Vouli) and a Greek Cypriot negotiator in the inter-communal talks of 196 8-1974, was elected President of the Republic. Initially, his election brought a new prospect for Cyprus, as he was one of the most constant politicians and supporters of Cyprus accession into the EU.A central issue of this foreign policy transformation has been the role of the EU and its mediation in the conflict resolution in Cyprus and the outcomes of Cyprus EU foreign policy orientation. It is widely accepted that throughout the years, the vast majority of initiatives for a negotiated settlement have been undertaken by the United Nations, with the active support of the United States . Until the early 1990s, the EC/EU was almost absent from the efforts for a settlement. That was because the role of the EC/EU as an international actor until the end of the Cold War was partially undermined. Its contribution to the conflict resolution using civilian and diplomatic instruments was poor.As Olga Demetriou accurately argues, the EU has played a minor role in the search for a solution to the Cyprus conflict in comparison with the UN and Britain, and even the US . However, during the last decade of the 20th century and the first decade of the 21st a substantial shift to the EUs role in the resolution of the Cyprus problem is noticed which vindicates the aspirations of Cypriot leadership.With the growth of the European Integration process and the initial empowerment of the EUs role as an international actor during the early 1990s with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, European fight in South-Eastern Europe grew steadily for a variety of different reasons. The political situation in the Middle East, the Euro-Turkish relations, as well as the substantial issue of immigration, have all make up the main reasons of the EUs broader interest in the region. Apart from that, Cyprus geographical location at the crossroads of three continents, made it inevitably very crucial as regards the security dimension .As afore distinguished, Cyprus European orientat ion officially began in 1990 when it applied for membership in the EEC. Since then, and due to the Turkish European aspiration, as well as the continuous Greek support on the Cyprus problem, the impact of the European Union towards the Cyprus conflict was steadily increasing. Moreover, Cyprus application for membership transformed the Cyprus problem into a European issue. However, in the initial stage of the accession process, the political problem was considered an obstacle for the accession and it was suggested that a settlement or at least significant moves towards one were necessary for Cyprus accession process to move forward .Various assumptions have been hypothesise regarding the issue of a settlement as a precondition for the accession. The provoked debate in the European Union has been between those who believed that Cyprus EU accession process would act as a catalyst for peace . Obviously, an public press on a solution before accession would undermine the prospect of Cyp rus EU accession process to act as a catalyst for peace.The question of whether Cyprus accession process should constitute a catalyst for peace was at the centre of the political debate and can be examined from different perspectives in regard to the interests of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. According to Tocci, the EUs role in the Cyprus problem has two dimensions the impact of the EU as a framework on conflict resolution efforts, and the impact of the accession process on the parties in conflict . This paper argues that the fact which constituted a crucial help in the resolution of the Cyprus problem was not Cyprus final accession in the EU, rather the effect of Cyprus EU accession process especially during the final stage. Additionally, another factor has been the partial shift in Turkish foreign policy, as a result of the Turkish European aspirations, which became more active after the coming of power of the AKP.The final stage of the EU accession process which coincided with the latest initiative of the Secretary General of the United Nations Kofi Anan had diverse effects to the policies of the two communities .It is important to mention that the EU, as well as the international community, tried in several ways to support the Yes campaign in both communities. There is no doubt that on both sides there were several political parties which were more active to the idea of a solution prior to accession. However there were parties which hardened their positions due to the elections in both communities before the referenda. For those who were in spare of a solution prior to accession, the Anan plan constituted an opportunity for a solution. Moreover, the EU had declared and urged the two communities to accept the Anan plan, showing its active support for a solution prior to accession based on the specific plan. Another significant element which shows the EUs positive involvement in the efforts for a resolution was its vigilance to economically support a possible solution prior to accession, as well as to provide financial aid to the new state, in order to eliminate the economic disproportion between the two communities.The decision to apply for membership in 1990 can be interpreted as an aim of strengthening the Greek Cypriot bargaining position in negotiations . Moreover Cyprus accession would confirm the Turkish attack and occupation of an EU member state.To put it differently, the EU, in its various structural, institutional and conceptual manifestations, has played, is still playing and is envisioned as having to play in the future, a variety of roles concerning the conflict in Cyprus. It remains to be seen whether this involvement will change in the future and whether the outcome of any mediation will bring a new prospect for Cyprus and its people. An overall assessment of Cyprus EU orientation reveals that the decision to apply for EEC membership in 1990 and partly transform the countrys foreign policy was a correct political evaluat ion and anticipation of the future prospects. However, Cyprus well-kept very good and friendly relations with other former Soviet states as well as with countries of the Arab Worlds and the NAM. Nevertheless, Cyprus as a full member of the EU, is implementing a Europe-oriented foreign policy which is relevant with the European structures and values. Is this statement always the case for Cyprus? An observation of some contemporary debates regarding Cyprus foreign policy and the countrys role in the international system, shows that sometimes, the countrys foreign policy is hostage to other factors which hamper it from its natural European orientation. The internal political debate about the issue of Cyprus application for Partnership for Peace membership which will be examined and assessed in the next chapter will prove the correctness of the above assumption.Cyprus Foreign Policy Hostage to ideology The issue of Partnership for Peace.The process of Europeanization defined as a proce ss of domestic change in order to align national policies with European structures as a result of potential membership- .This section will examine the contemporary debate which emerged recently in the Cyprus national political arena concerning the issue of Cyprus application for accession into NATOs programme PfP. Nevertheless, before analysing the domestic political debate regarding the issue of PfP, there is a necessity to clarify and examine some basic theoretical issues about the evolving role of the EU as an actor in the international system. This analysis is crucial, as it is related with the indistinct relations between NATO and the EU which directly affect the examined case of Cyprus and PfP. record proves to us that initiatives to create a common defence policy are not inextricable from European Integration but they are its precondition. The fact that the efforts have been numerous and of dubious outcome underline the complexity of the goal, but also its necessity. Undoubt edly, the failure of the EDC initiative in 1954, ensured that defence related issues were being discussed outside the EEC context . However, towards the late 1990s, there was a gradual departure from this policy path.A turning point in the happen made towards ESDP was the summit in St-Malo in December 1998 . Furthermore, relations between the EU and NATO came into question regarding this issue. However , despite the efforts and the to date implementation of 23 missions, the extent to which EUs security and defence role in the new security architecture in the immediate post-cold war period